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Abstract 
Implementation of principles of the Codes on Corporate Governance (CCG) is aimed at 
minimizing agency conflicts and corporate governance problems in the listed firms but 
we see them emerging over and over again despite the rapid implementation of CCG by 
listed firms, motivate us to develop this theoretical framework to  understand why do the 
firms accept the voluntary principles and what type of behaviours could be expected 
among and between the top management personnel. 
 
  
3 
 
Introduction 
Due to the adaptability to suit the needs of listed firms, codes on corporate governance 
have become popular in listed companies across many market economies (Gregory & 
Simmelkjaer, 2002) and in many emerging market economies big and small such as 
China (Tam, 2000), Taiwan (Luan and Tang, 2007) and Sri Lanka (Gunetilleke, 2009). 
The rapid implementation of the codes on corporate governance has caused to strengthen 
the board and the role of NEDs to avoid agency conflicts and many other corporate 
governance problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Pass, 2004, 
Cromme, 2005). However, empirical studies find that the agency conflicts and corporate 
governance problems emerge repeatedly (Fleming & Zyglidopoulos, 2006; Luo, 2006). 
The editorial of the Wall Street Journal (2008) points out that even the mandatory 
regulation of Sarbanes – Oxley Act 2002 has not succeeded entirely to prevent frauds in 
the context of US. Luo (2006) shows a variety of managerial opportunisms such as 
behaviour performed by one party to seek unilateral gains at the expense of another party 
or parties by breaching explicit or implicit agreements, exercising private control, 
withholding or distorting information, withdrawing commitments or promises, shirking 
obligations, or grafting joint earnings.  
 
Therefore, what we see is a ‘paradoxical compliance’ (MacDonald, Nail & Levy, 
2004:78), that is the acceptance of codes on corporate governance and at the same time 
emerging corporate governance problems. Therefore, we have an ‘intellectual puzzle’ 
(Mason, 1986:15) as to why do the listed firms voluntarily accept the principles of codes 
on corporate governance? and why the acceptance of them is so rapid across the firms?  
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The aim of this paper is to answer this intellectual puzzle by paying particular attention to 
type of behaviours among CEOs and NEDs through a theoretical analysis and subsequent 
formulation of propositions, which is structured as follows. First, we highlight the 
significance of the exploration of the issue. Then, we explain the ideas of voluntary code 
of corporate governance and provide evidence to justify the paradoxical issue. The final 
and the major section of the article are the presentation of supportive literature and 
formulation of propositions.    
 
The intended theoretical analysis is important for number of reasons. First, the 
implementation of the principles of codes by a firm costs to stakeholders. The cost may 
include quantifiable items such as payment for the NEDs to attend the meetings, 
travelling expenses, remuneration of Chair and so on and non-quantifiable expenses such 
as allocation of the time of executives to prepare various reports for the NEDs and Chair 
(Vafeas, 2003). According to the Financial Reporting Council in the UK (FRC, 2006), 
various elements of costs to be borne by the listed companies include, fees for the new 
NEDs, costs for tailored induction for new directors, cost for training and development of 
the skills and knowledge of NEDs, performance evaluation of the board, additional 
company secretarial resources and insurance cover. These expenses are to be borne none 
other than the shareholders. In the case of mandatory regulations, a part of cost is born by 
taxpayers and regulatory bodies such as the Registrar of Companies and the Independent 
Oversight Bodies appointed under the direction of the Sarbanes - Oxley Act, 2002 in the 
US (Anand, 2005). In the case of voluntary compliance and less mandatory regulations, 
investors have to bear the cost of monitoring. Therefore, better corporate governance is 
required to reduce these expenditures.  
5 
 
 
In addition, corporate governance in listed companies is important due to the creation of 
employment opportunities, contribution to the economy of a country and cross border 
capital flows etc. (McKinsey Global Institute, 2008). Failure of corporate governance 
results in a huge social cost to the society especially to taxpayers as evidenced by the 
historical case of the South Sea Bubble (Chapman, 1986) and with many collapses in 
1990s such as the Bearing Bank, Enron and World Com and very recent bankruptcies 
such as the Northern Rock bank in the UK and Lehman Brothers (Šević, 2005). Authors 
have studied various factors which influence the listed companies in their choice of 
internal corporate governance mechanisms (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Bathala & Rao, 1995). 
However, there is a gap in the literature to understand the factors, which could influence 
the listed companies to comply with the voluntary codes on corporate governance. 
Therefore, our analysis could be a significant contribution for corporate governance 
literature in particular and to organisational practices in general.   
 
Voluntary Codes of Corporate Governance  
Security Exchange Commissions or the regulators of the public limited liability 
companies (PLCs) in many countries have introduced non-regulatory codes or voluntary 
codes on corporate governance. Code of Best Practices, popularly known as the Cadbury 
guidelines (Cadbury, 1992) and the subsequent introduction of many other codes provide 
guidelines for the PLCs to improve corporate governance practice
i
. The present 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 2008) has incorporated many of these 
guidelines as main principles and provisions which consist: (1) separation of the role of 
the Chair and the CEO, (2) appointment of majority of NEDs, (3) appointment of number 
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of sub committees of the board of directors comprising only the NEDs (audit, 
remuneration and nomination), and (4) appointment of a senior independent director to 
liaise between the institutional investors and the board as well as the NEDs and the Chair.  
 
These principles and provisions have been incorporated as listing rules in the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). PLCs in the Main Market of the LSE are required to either 
comply with or explain the reasons for not complying with the Combined Code (FRC, 
2008).  A large number of companies in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the 
LSE also implement some of the principles of the above code when they are only 
encouraged to think of getting the benefit of accepting the guidelines of the Combined 
Code (Gunetilleke, 2009).  ‘Comply or explain’ (FRC, 2008:1) principle suggests listed 
companies to choose the best practices to suit the size of the firm, future needs and 
potential agency conflicts rather than pushing firms on to a mandatory compliance or to a 
model of  ‘one-size fit-all’ (Filatotchev, 2005:26) such as the Sarbanes - Oxley Act 2002. 
Studies of Piotroski & Srinivasan (2007) point out that some of the firms de-listed from 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) have listed in the AIM in the LSE in order to 
avoid mandatory regulations of the Sarbanes - Oxley Act 2002 and some Initial Public 
Offers (IPOs) have opted to go to the AIM instead of listing in the NYSE.  
 
 
 
Corporations are Social Units  
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Understanding the reasons for the emergence of mandatory company regulations such as 
the Companies Acts and non-mandatory regulations such as the CCG is required in the 
context of the broader social framework. Social contract theory argues that the citizens of 
a country and the government enter into a contract and accordingly, government has to 
take necessary actions to meet the expectations of the society. Authors argue that the 
listed firms are social units with a specific role to play in the economy and the society 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). According to Aguilera et al., (2006), firms are situated 
within a given society and political tradition, which will influence the decisions of 
individuals within the firm. Of course, corporations are an essential integral in the 
organizational society (Morgan, 1997) and therefore whether they be large or small, 
companies are social units as they are created to fulfill the expectations of the society 
(Ducker, 1974).  When there is a threat for the normal situation, a government comes 
under pressure from the society to take corrective action (McCormick, 1976). Corporate 
failures in the capital markets have been such a trigger to disrupt the status quo in the 
society as evidenced by the corporate collapses.   
Influence of social forces on managerial behaviour  
Organisational man is a social and political animal and the behaviour is conditioned by 
the social norms and values in the organisation Gibson (1966). As noted in the Social 
identification theory (Obst & White, 2005), the members of a society whether known or 
unknown to each other build up a ‘Psychological sense of community, in which the 
foundation is the acceptance of the social norms and values. In such a community, a little 
request to comply for something could lead to a large compliance (Scott, 1977). 
Structures and processes build up to accommodate and pull individuals into the line of 
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beliefs and practices of the society. If there is a deviant behaviour, punishments are 
inevitable and the rewards are offered for the obedient members across all the structured 
organisations such as the armed forces, educational institutions, religious places and in 
business organisations (Sonnenfeld, 1985).  
 
The nature of such social units is to associate with the likely minds and to follow the 
social norms established in order to maintain the coherent values and the program of 
actions (Kadushin, 2002). In order to ensure that the members follow the structured 
norms and values, Bowles & Gintis (2002) argue that informal build up of social norms 
stand up to avoid any threats for the stability and the orderly conduct of the norms and 
values. Bothner (2003) argues that when a social actor’s rivals have adopted an 
advantageous trait, that actor is then likely to adopt it in order to avert the probable social 
and economic costs of falling behind. Feldman (1984) also points out that ‘Informal rules 
adopt to regularize group members’ behaviour. As such, PLCs operate to achieve not 
only the individual corporate objectives but also to protect common interests of them, 
especially when there are threats to change the existing structures such as statutory and 
non-statutory rules and regulations (Ornstein, 1984). Accordingly, Organisational men 
(Gibson, 1966), such as the board of directors, CEOs, the elites in top management 
(Pettigrew, 1992) are influential in maintaining a certain framework of social norms in 
the business society (Mizruchi, 1983).  
 
Managers with social contact networks monitor information more effectively (Burt, 
1997). Network structures are a key decisive force on the speed of spreading the 
governance practices and expose a firm to a particular role model (Davis & Greve, 1997). 
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Thus, managers have a collective informal behaviour due to the influence of the interlock 
directorates (Davis, 1991). Therefore, corporate actions are not determined solely by the 
characteristics of their own but also by the actions and characteristics of other 
organizations in its environment (Davis, 1991).  
 
Ornstein (1984) investigating the interlocking directorships of more than 5,000 interlocks 
among the largest Canadian companies during the period of 1946 to 1977 argues that 
interlocking directorates serve to coordinate the political and ideological orientation of 
the capitalist society. Accordingly, boards are viewed as vehicles that corporations use to 
control other corporations, to co-opt threats in their environment from competitors, 
suppliers, customers, and regulatory agencies. Similarly, D’Aveni & Kesner (1993) argue 
that Cooperation and resistance may be a function of the social networks and power 
relationships that exists between and within firms. Thus, social influences lead to 
‘Coercive isomorphism’ or the acceptance of a certain pattern of behaviour under 
influence (Ashforth & Gibbs (1990:178). In such situations, the CEOs as well as the 
NEDs could become the targets to overt conformity (Quiamzade et al., 2003). Stiles & 
Taylor (2001) argue that executives would follow the plans of chief executives, but may 
not agree with the plans in private but approve as they depend on the CEO for their own 
ambition of reaching to the top position of the firm. As such, an individual has to subdue 
self-conscientiousness of the need to resist for external influences. PLCs may comply for 
a certain way of doing business collectively in order to avoid any damage on business 
(Bothner, 2003). Reflecting this reality, Neilson & Rao (1987) argue that people do not 
speak openly about information and ideas if it might harm their chances at achieving their 
objectives or if it validates their standards of personal development. Does this necessarily 
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mean that there can be gaps between social expectations and actual behaviour of 
managers? 
 
According to Soeters (1986), the model of excellent companies (Peter & Waterman, 
1982) highlights behaviours similar to the norms and values of cults in the US that 
existed during 1980s. In cults, there is a certain belief about the world and life with a 
strong leadership and devoted set of followers who do not question the beliefs and the 
values other than sharing them with the fellow members (Stark & Bainbridge, 1980). The 
values and the beliefs bind them all together. Similarly, in the excellent companies, the 
employees were groomed to believe of certain values in business and each and everybody 
shared the same irrespective of the position of the firm. The tendency to maintain and 
build relations is high in the right context. Grossetti (2005) argues that the social relations 
are created among people when they have close interests and are aroused out of certain 
contexts but rarely on chance meetings. The argument behind shared values and 
principles of culture of an organisation also justify this view point. As human beings are 
frequently motivated to create and maintain social relationships with others (Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004), it is important to note that mutual gains solidify those relationships 
(Jensen & Greve, 2002), which may lead to create strong social processes (Ryan, 1999).  
In the above context of social influence for the individual role in corporations, 
organisational men (Gibson, 1966), compare and contrast their practices with the others 
in similar level or above their levels of operations and follow the same pattern (Suls, 
Martin & Wheeler, 2002; Shackleton, 2005). Thus, the mimetic behaviour is a natural 
phenomenon. As Hong, Kubik & Stein (2004) observed, the transactions of stocks in the 
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stock exchange by shareholders are influenced by the decisions of peer groups. In order 
to stand for the common needs of a larger society and to maintain social legitimacy, 
companies are keen to maintain public relations (Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989). Public 
relations through social interactions help companies to fall in line with the societal values 
(Monks & Minow, 2004). When a company does business respecting the societal and 
ethical values of a society apart from the legal compliance (Goodpaster, 1991), it gains 
social legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Falling in line with the above arguments of social 
influences and interactions, Menon & Williams (1994) argue that the formation of sub 
committees of the board is an attempt to show good governance to make the shareholders 
pleased. As such Weir & Laing (2001) questioned, do companies regard complying with 
Cadbury as a public relations exercise? In line with these realities and arguments, we 
derive our first proposition.      
Proposition 1: Corporations implement the principles and provisions of the voluntary 
Codes on Corporate Governance due to either isomorphic or mimetic 
behavior or the both  
 
Resistance to Social Influences 
If the acceptance of corporate governance codes were purely in view of the needs of the 
investors other than the influence of the social forces, investors would be lucky to get 
‘informed decisions’ (Monks and Minow, 2004:83). Private firms may find it difficult to 
attract investors by IPOs due to lack of trust by investors (Pagano, Panetta & Zingales, 
1998). In general, information plays the key role in making informed decision by market 
participants and therefore the availability of information in the corporate sector suggests a 
good state of financial transparency and governance transparency (Bushman, Piotroski & 
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Smith, 2004). As Fama & Jensen (1983) argue shareholders are risk experts in 
diversifying the portfolio of investments but face the problem of information asymmetry 
as the managers withhold some information. With regard to the link between information 
and corporate governance mechanism, a number of authors find that corporate 
governance mechanisms such as the appointment of NEDs and the separation of chair and 
the CEO would result in increased disclosures and strong incentives for the shareholders 
to remain loyal with their investments (Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Bushman, Piotroski & 
Smith, 2004; Barako, Hancock & Izan, 2006).   
 
According to some scholars (Schmidt & Spindler, 2002); Zahra & Filatotchev 2004), 
specific corporate governance mechanisms of a firm would be decided by path 
dependence, level of knowledge acquisition and contingencies and life cycle stage of a 
firm. As such, Filatotchev (2005) argues that the development of ‘one size fits all’ 
corporate governance codes may be highly problematic for firms at different thresholds in 
their life cycle.  Similarly, Pye & Camm (2003) also questioned about the rationality of a 
particular model for all the companies. For example, Finkelstein & D’Aveni (1994) point 
out that the holding of both the role of Chair and CEO by a single hand (duality) is 
required when a firm needs to map out strong strategies and to implement and monitor 
the performance of executives at crises. They suggest that when a firm has continuous 
success in the market, it is required to separate the office of Chair and CEO. Unless the 
separation of office of Chair and CEO is done, CEO becomes powerful with the good 
results and gets entrenched.  
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Some firms resort to the minimum legal requirements to practice corporate governance 
codes due to switching costs (Hart, 1995, Vafeas, 1999). In a study of the implications of 
de-regulations in the US on the airline industry, Kole & Lehn (1997) found that the 
corporate governance structures evolve to suit the competition and the inability to make 
the changes in a firm lead to disappearance of the same from the market place. According 
to them, firms that survive in competitive markets are presumed to have optimal 
governance structures. In addition, Li (1994) finds that the ownership structure, the 
degree of leverage, size of the firm, level of performance in the market and strategy of the 
firm decide the structural composition of the board. Williams, Fadil & Artmstrong (2005) 
also argue that moderate size of a board has the ability of minimising illegal activities in 
organisations when they have complex structures and scattered markets. Accordingly, we 
develop our second proposition.  
Proposition 2:  Corporations which comply with selected principles and provisions of the 
Codes on Corporate Governance do so due to their own specific needs 
and are not influenced by isomorphic or mimetic behavior. 
 
Codes on corporate Governance and the Behaviour of CEOs and NEDs 
When there are more NEDs than the insider directors or the executive directors in the 
board, the ability of the CEO to enjoy privileges such as the appointment of the desired 
personnel rather than the best, give them promotions and maintaining perquisites such as 
luxurious offices (Berle & Means, 1933) and higher compensation for self and favoured 
executives could be limited (Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005). Therefore, the excessive 
monitoring by NEDs would lead the CEO to find ways of reaching the NEDs and 
enhancing his or her power base through impression management (Gardner & Martinko, 
1988; Westphal, 1998). The tenure of a CEO is a decisive factor to influence the NEDs as 
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more the tenure of work experience of a CEO more the knowledge and ability to 
influence the NEDs to approve business plans (Hill & Phan, 1991). CEO has the 
authority of the information system in the firm and the willingness to provide information 
required by the NEDs seems to rest upon the CEO. Impression management tactics of the 
CEO towards the NEDs would result in recognition of the abilities of the CEO by the 
NEDs and in securing approval for his plans of diversification decisions (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990).  CEO’s are keen to diversify through mergers and takeovers because they 
have no any other way of diversifying their own risk of job survival (Amihud & Lev, 
1981). In their study on the relationship between CEO and the board, Zajac & Westphal 
(1996) also agree with the above view as they suggest that by diversifying into unrelated 
businesses, managers can stabilize their investment portfolios and reduce their 
employment risk. 
 
With regard to relationship between executive directors and CEOs, Katz & Kahn (1978) 
argue that a relationship built among colleagues centred on the CEO during a long-term 
period bind them all strong as a group. The charisma of a CEO results in creating 
favourable attribution among the followers because a successful CEO creates a sense of 
mission and an inspirational vision (Waldman et al., 2004). The relationships built on 
these practices would lead to a high level of cohesiveness and therefore tend to take 
action jointly. Hambrick & Mason (1984) also agree with the above contention that CEOs 
share tasks and to some extent power with other team members. All these arguments are 
in line with Drucker’s (1974) assertion that large organisations face unstructured, 
complex and uncertain decision environments and therefore, it is difficult for a single 
person to take managerial responsibilities.  
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Exploring another aspect of these relationships further, Borokhovich, Parrino & Trapani 
(1996) note that executive directors depend on the CEO for their promotions and future 
career expectations. Offer of outsider executive directorships to insider executives is 
mainly decided by the relational power of the executives to the CEO (Richardson, 1987). 
Executive directors get their power through their position and relationships with the CEO 
(Minszberg, 1983). Thus, the protection of the CEO from an emerging power will be 
considered as important by the executive directors.  Unless it is done, all the privileges 
enjoyed by the long stay of executives in the company will be lost. In this context, it 
could be expected that a CEO be supported by the subordinates to face any threats in the 
environment including the regulatory bodies. Katz & Kahn (1978) of course argue that a 
relationship built among colleagues centred on the CEO during a long-term period bind 
them all strong as a group.  Therefore, the NEDs could be considered by them as a threat 
for their usual way of making decisions in strategy formulation and day-to-day 
operations. As such, Walsh & Seward (1990), argue that Managerial or CEO’s behaviour 
could cripple the corporate governance mechanisms.  In the long run, in the context of 
polarisation of relations between the NEDs and the executive directors due to the 
widened information asymmetry, lack of strategic thinking and faulty attributions for 
success and failure by both the board and the management could occur (Sundaramurthy 
& Lewis, 2003). As a result, a corporation would not be competitive in the market and 
eventually would collapse (Thusman & Oreilly, 1996).  If the working relationship of the 
management and the board were good, it would create a situation to get the best possible 
corporate governance mechanisms (Westphall, 1999). Stewardship theory of corporate 
governance also believes that the managers are conscious to protect the assets of the 
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shareholders (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997) and therefore they must be 
encouraged. As such, the board tends to be in more supportive mood that in control 
mood.   
According to Mizruchi, board of directors represents ‘a self-perpetuating oligarchy 
accountable to themselves’ (1983:427). The NEDs too are a part of the board. NEDs are 
professional referees (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Their future prospects of getting NED posts 
elsewhere depend on how they perform in the present corporation. Maintenance of 
reputation of the NEDs as expert decision makers enables them to get more directorships 
(Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003), more earnings (Yermack, 2004), and higher 
positions in the future career (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). However, such developments of 
a NED could not always be considered as useful because Baumeister & Exline 
(1999:1173) argue that prideful people may be so self focused that they are less prone to 
contribute to the group’s welfare or to be willing to make sacrifices for others. Many 
researchers argue that the NEDs could behave opportunistically to protect their reputation 
(e.g. Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Helland & Sykuta, 2005; Miwa & Ramseyer, 2005). 
Therefore, there could be a tendency to emphasize more on corporate governance than 
the prime role of the director that is directing the corporations to achieve the business 
objectives of the shareholders (Jensen & Fuller, 2002). If the NEDs were opportunistic to 
serve their own interest as argued above, they would be more interested in outcome 
behavior rather than the strategic behavior (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In such situations, 
the NEDs would behave opportunistically to claim the good performance of the 
corporation as their own effort and in the case of poor performance; they would say that 
the CEO has chosen wrong strategies (Walsh & Seward, 1990).  Based on the above 
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arguments on the behavior of the NEDs to protect their self-interest, we develop the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 3:  Self-serving CEOs and NEDs would insist the implementation of the  
  codes on corporate governance irrespective of firm specific needs 
 
Conclusions and Implications for Research 
Codes on corporate governance and their implementation have become very popular 
across many countries. However, empirical studies revealed number of issues associated 
with the acceptance of principles of CCG and the behaviors of CEOs and NEDs. In this 
paper we attempted to answer the intellectual puzzle of why do listed firms voluntarily 
accept the principles of CCG? In addition, what are the types of behaviors among CEOs 
and NEDs in the relevant context? Through a theoretical analysis and accompanying 
propositions.  It was revealed that it is important to understand whether the firms accept 
corporate governance in order to improve their own governance or whether to follow the 
others (mimetic behaviour) or whether the firms are coerced to follow (isomorphic 
behaviour) or else whether the NEDs themselves are keen to protect their goodwill and 
thus are strict in corporate governance or else whether the opportunistic CEOs accept 
them and make an impression to the market on their firms. This is really a difficult issue 
to answer easily. The propositions built on above themes are useful to think in real terms 
whether the acceptance of the codes on corporate governance shows best practices in 
corporate governance. Authors have documented evidence to support that the type of 
internal corporate governance mechanisms are a result of the evolutionary process as well 
as on the particular needs of the firms. However, when there are a significant number of 
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companies accept and implement the non-regulatory codes on corporate governance, we 
must question why and how as well as the implications of such a change. The pattern of 
change will follow a particular direction or route and largely all societies will eventually 
go down the same road (Warren, 2003).  So what are the specific countries and 
companies who follow the same root? Are there different roots to follow when facing 
changing circumstances under new global issues and realities of corporate world? 
Answers lie with further exploration of the implementation of CCGs.      
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